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Although economic analysis of the common law, crime, and legal decision making are relatively recent areas of research in the
field of law and economics, economic analysis of antitrust, particularly the analysis of business practices described in antitrust cases,
has been widespread and uncontroversial for many years. What
has received less attention is the use of economics to examine antitrust enforcement itself.1 This involves analyzing, for example,
what is an antitrust injury, the appropriate sanctions for such an
injury, the choice between public and private enforcement of antitrust laws and related questions on standing to sue, and the rele-

vance of the antitrust victim's conduct to his ability to recover
damages. In this paper I apply economics to some of the above
issues.
Economic analysis of antitrust enforcement builds on the pioneering papers of Gary Becker and Ronald Coase.2 Becker's paper
was the first formal analysis of optimal penalties and probabilities
of apprehension and conviction for criminal offenses. He showed
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Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations
that when the costs of enforcement are positive, it is generally not
optimal to reduce the number of violations to zero. More surprisingly, Becker also showed that even if enforcement costs are zero,
it is still not desirable to deter all violations because some offenses-where the gain to the offender exceeds the harm to the
victim-are efficient. The concept of an efficient violation is the
key to determining the optimal antitrust penalty. Although Coase's
paper is usually cited for the proposition (known as "Coase's theorem") that in the absence of transaction costs alternative liability
rules do not affect resource allocation, it marked the beginning of
systematic study by economists and academic lawyers of the effects
of alternative liability rules on resource allocation in high transaction cost settings. Because an antitrust violation is equivalent to an
intentional tort, one can analyze many antitrust enforcement issues by applying the economic analysis of tort liability.
This paper is divided into three parts. The first part presents
an economic analysis of optimal antitrust penalties. The second
applies the analysis to several topics in antitrust including joint
ventures, the social cost of monopoly, cartels that face competition
from fringe firms, and predatory pricing. The final section applies
the economic analysis of intentional torts to antitrust enforcement.
I.
A.

THE THEORY OF OPTIMAL SANCTIONS

The Basic Model of Optimal Sanctions

I begin with a simple example that brings out the basic intuition of an an optimal sanction. In Figure 1, industry marginal cost,
MCO
0 , is constant and equal to the supply curve under competition;
the competitive output and price equal Q0 and P 0 ; and a cartel
would reduce output to Q1 and raise price to P 1 . I assume further
that a cartel would impose a deadweight loss of $50 (area B) and
an aggregate overcharge of $100 (area A). Total harm to consumers
equals $150, the sum of the aggregate overcharge and deadweight
loss.
The standard economic rationale for making a cartel illegal is
not that it charges too high a price or that it redistributes income
from consumers to cartel members, but that it restricts output,
causing a deadweight or efficiency loss (area B)-a loss to consumers without an offsetting gain to producers. To prevent this loss
one can penalize cartel members by an amount sufficient to deter
them from organizing a cartel in the first instance. To simplify the
analysis of optimal penalties, I assume the following: all parties are
risk neutral; enforcement costs, including legal fees, court costs,
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and time costs, are zero; the penalty is a monetary fine; and, provisionally, the probability of apprehension and conviction is fixed
and equal to one.$ Given these assumptions, what is the optimal
penalty?
FIGURE 1

Price

MC.

One possible penalty is the social or deadweight loss of $50.
I also assume that consumers do not take account of a possible damage recovery in
deciding how many units of the good to purchase. If they did, this would complicate
the
analysis. Then, one would have to consider both consumer anticipations of a recovery and
the response of the cartel, knowing that consumers adjust their purchases in light of
the
prospect of an antitrust recovery. This is considered briefly in Landes & Posner, supra
note
1, at 606-08, and infra at notes 49-54 and accompanying text
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The argument might be that since enforcement costs are zero and
the penalty is certain, an offender should be made to pay the deadweight or social cost of his offense. The difficulty with this rule is
that despite the penalty, it still may be profitable to form the cartel. In our example, a $50 fine will be too low. Firms would not
forgo cartel profits of $100 to avoid a $50 fine. Consider an analogy
to theft. One would not deter a thief from stealing $100 cash by a
penalty equal to the lower social cost of the theft, measured by the
monetary equivalent of the services the victim forgoes by holding
lower cash balances in response to the possibility of theft.
Alternatively, why not impose a fine many times greater than
the social cost? A $10,000 fine surely would deter firms from forming a cartel to earn a $100 profit. Given our assumption that the
cartel causes a $50 deadweight loss, a $10,000 fine or a $10 million
fine would yield the correct outcome. In general, however, large
fines will not yield the correct outcome.' A fine of $10,000 or even a
fine of $151 in our example could be too large because deterrence
alone is not the aim of penalties. The purpose of penalties, following Becker's model of crime and punishment, is to deter inefficient
offenses, not efficient ones. Stated differently, the optimal level of
offenses is generally greater than zero.
To explain, suppose the cartel is able to reduce production
costs, but cost savings can be obtained only by restricting output.5
Returning to Figure 1, let MC1 denote the cartel's marginal cost.
Notice that MC 1 is below MC 0 until the output Q1, and at Q1 the
cartel's marginal cost curve becomes perfectly inelastic. Admittedly, the assumption of a fixed production capacity for the cartel
at Q1 is unrealistic. It has the advantage, however, of simplifying
the explanation of an optimal fine. The aggregate cost saving from
the cartel equals the shaded area C. If C is greater than $50, the
cartel's offense is efficient: the offense produces greater cost savings than the deadweight loss it imposes by restricting output. For
example, if C were $51, there is a net gain of $1 from the cartel.
4 Fines of this magnitude raise two problems not considered in this paper. The first is
the problem of marginal deterrence: if all fines are large and differences between them are
small relative to differences in harm, offenders tend to commit the most harmful offenses.
See Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. EcON. 526, 527-28 (1970). The
other is the possibility of legal error, which combined with large fines can deter socially
valuable business behavior. For an application of legal error to antitrust enforcement, see
Polinsky & Shavell, Contributionand Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An
Economic Analysis, 33 STAN. L. Rav. 447 (1981).
5 The question of how these savings could arise is discussed infra at notes 11-16 and
accompanying text.
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Because the cartel's total gain is $151 (equal to the $100 overcharge plus the $51 cost savings), a fine greater than $151 would
deter its formation. This outcome would be inefficient, deterring a
socially beneficial cartel. Under other circumstances, a fine less
than $150 would be inefficient. For example, if C were $49 and the
fine $148, the cartel would be formed ($149 profits minus $148 fine
leaves the cartel with a net gain of $1), yet society would be worse
off by $1 because the deadweight loss exceeds the cost savings
made possible by the cartel.
The rule for determining the optimal fine or damage award is
simple to state: the fine should equal the net harm to persons other
than the offender.' In our example this harm is $150, the $100
overcharge plus the $50 deadweight loss. If we follow the net harm
rule, the offense will only take place when the gain to the offender
exceeds the net harm to others, and the cartel will be deterred
7
when the gain is less than the harm.
I note several additional points.
1. The imposition of a penalty in the example of Figure 1 does
not depend on an actual increase in price above P 0 . If it did, a
cartel could avoid any antitrust liability by reducing output to Q1
but maintaining price at P 0 , for example, by rationing demand on
a first-come-first-served basis.' Suppose the cartel's cost savings
(area C) equaled $10. Without a penalty, the cartel could reap
profits equal to its $10 cost savings, yet the arrangement would be
inefficient; it would produce a net loss of $40, equal to a $50 deadweight loss minus a $10 cost savings. In contrast, the net harm rule
yields an efficient outcome. Here the net harm is the $50 deadweight loss. Assuming no overcharge, a $50 penalty deters the inefficient cartel (whose cost saving is less than $50) but not the efficient one (whose cost saving is greater than $50).
2. Suppose there is no capacity constraint at Q1 in Figure 1
and the cartel lowers marginal cost everywhere to MC1 . Using the
net harm rule, the fine equals the aggregate overcharge plus dead6I use the term "net" harm to allow for possible benefits to third parties that result
from offenses. This has important implications for optimal penalties which I explore infra in
part 11-B.
7Formally, the solution to the optimal line in Figure 1 is as follows: Let B=deadweight
loss to consumers from reduced output; C=cost savings brought about by a reduction in
output; F=fine; and A=monopoly profit (before taking account of C and F). We want to
choose a value for F such that A + C - F (=net monopoly profit) is positive only if C>B.
As described in text, F = A + B, then substituting (A + B) for F, A + C - (A + B)>0
only if C>B.
8 I ignore in this example the monetary equivalent of the costs imposed on buyers by
the rationing scheme.
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weight loss (areas A + B) only when output falls below the initial
competitive output Q0. This would lead the cartel to produce at
least Q0 units of output. Assuming it produces Q0, the net harm
and hence fine would be zero, and net profits would equal the aggregate cost savings up to Q0. Any lower output would lead to a
fine and to lower net profits.9 Still, one might view Q0 as a "second-best" outcome compared to the greater output where MC 1 intersects the demand curve. But it is unclear how to use antitrust
penalties to induce the cartel to produce this more efficient output.
The required penalty (which would equal the overcharge and deadweight loss computed from the point where MC 1 intersects the demand curve) would remove any incentive for firms to form the cartel that creates the cost savings. 10
3. The optimal fine or damage rule must be modified when the
probability of apprehension and conviction is less than one and enforcement costs are positive. In such circumstances, the fine would
equal net harm (which includes enforcement costs per case) divided by the probability of apprehension and conviction. In Figure
1, for example, if enforcement costs per case are $10 and the
probability of conviction is one-third, the cartel causes harm of
$160 ($100 overcharge plus $50 ordinary deadweight loss plus $10
enforcement costs), and the fine would equal $480 ($160 divided by
1/3). Since the expected value of the fine is $160 (480 x 1/3) firms
would form a cartel only if their cost savings were greater than $60.
This too is the efficient outcome because the offsetting deadweight
loss, including enforcement costs, is $60.

'

Let C equal the cost saving up to Q0 and let k equal QI/Q0 < 1 where Q, is any
output less than Q0 . At Q1 the cartel's profit equals A + kC - F. Under the net harm rule,
the fine is (A + B). Substituting A + B for F yields a profit kC - B, which is less than C.
Since the cartel's net profit is C at Q0 (because the fine is zero) the cartel prefers Q0 to any
output Q1 less than Q0 . Notice that if the reduction in marginal cost is sufficiently great and
the demand curve sufficiently elastic at Q0 , the cartel's profit-maximizing output may be
greater than Q0 .
10 Patent pooling presents a comparable problem. Consider a group of firms that have
valid but competing patents that enable the industry to lower marginal costs everywhere

from MC 0 to MC,. Absent cross-licensing and pooling (perhaps because of antitrust liability) the royalty rate would be close to zero, and firms would produce at the point where

MC1 intersects the demand curve. With pooling, the royalty rate would be positive, output
lower, and price higher. The argument for pooling (analogous to the assumption in the text
that the cartel "causes" the cost savings) is that its absence would sufficiently reduce the
expected returns to innovation and, therefore, discourage firms from investing the resources
necessary to develop the innovation.
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Sanctions for a Cost-Saving Cartel

I have used the example of an efficient cartel to explain the
meaning of an optimal antitrust penalty. I have not explained,
however, why the cost savings shown in Figure 1 could not have
been achieved without the cartel and without restricting output
from Q0 to Q1. Consider the following example.
Suppose a group of firms pump oil from a common pool, and
no firm has a property right to the oil until it is removed from the
ground. This example illustrates a well-known economic problem:
in the absence of property rights to a scarce resource, competition
carries production beyond the efficient level because no firm takes
account of the external technical diseconomies it imposes on other
firms. Here an agreement among firms to restrict output and raise
price can lead to a more efficient output level.11 At the same time,
if firms are free from antitrust liability, they may restrict output
even further, possibly yielding a less efficient outcome than the
precartel equilibrium. An antitrust penalty equal to the net harm
will give firms an incentive to restrict output, but only to the efficient level.
Figure 2 illustrates the problem. To simplify, I assume that
firms are equally efficient, each firm produces one unit of output,
and there is free entry. Competition among equally efficient firms
and free entry will eliminate any profits. Hence firms will enter the
industry until each firm operates where its cost (equal to its average cost) equals price. This occurs at the output Q0 and price P 0 ,
where demand intersects the industry supply schedule, S. S is also
the industry average cost curve because each point on it measures
the firm's cost of producing one unit of output. As demand shifts
to the right, new firms will enter and impose external technical diseconomies on the old firms, raising their cost. The entrant, however, only considers its cost and not the added cost it imposes on
other firms. Thus, marginal cost of producing an additional unit of
output (via a new entrant) is greater than average cost (the cost
incurred by the new entrant). Therefore, at Q0 the value of an additional unit of output, measured along the demand curve, is less

11

The classic article on this subject is Knight, Some Fallaciesin the Interpretationof

Social Cost, 38 Q.J. EcoN. 582 (1924), reprinted in READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 160 (G. Stigler & K. Boulding eds. 1952). Knight analyzed the problem of transporting goods along a

narrow but well-graded road. Id. at 584-88. The main point of Knight's article was to show
that if someone owned the road, he would charge a price for access that led to its efficient
use. An alternative mechanism to achieve efficiency is for firms to agree to limit their use of

the road.
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than the marginal cost of producing that output. Observe that Q0
exceeds the efficient output level Q1 which occurs when demand
intersects marginal cost. Thus, an agreement among firms to restrict output to Q1 would yield a more efficient allocation of resources. But in the absence of a fine, firms would have an incentive
to restrict output below Q1, to the point where marginal revenue
equals marginal cost. This would produce the usual deadweight
loss from a cartel or monopoly.
FIGURE 2

Price

S=AC

P

-

I
I
I

I
I
I

I
I
I

I
I
I

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

I

E

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

Quantity

The solution is to set a penalty small enough to provide firms
with an incentive to reduce output to Q1 but not so small that they
reduce output below Q1. That fine equals the aggregate overcharge
plus deadweight loss measured from the initial output Q0. This is
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the same net harm rule analyzed earlier. I will give an intuitive
explanation for this result. 12 If firms continue to operate at Q0,
there is no fine and each firm would earn zero profits (price equals
average cost by assumption). Firms would not operate at an output
greater than Q0 because average cost would exceed price and the
firms would lose money. Now suppose the firms form a cartel and
restrict output to Q1, the point at which marginal cost equals
price. Under the net harm rule presented in this paper, the cartel
will be assessed a fine equal to the deadweight loss and net overcharge. After deducting the per-unit overcharge fine of P 1 - P 0 ,1 3
each firm will receive the same net price as it did when output was
Q0.On the units no longer produced, Q0-Qi, firms forgo revenues
equal to P 0 times Q0-Q 1 " and in addition incur penalties equal to
the deadweight loss from restricting output.1 5 In short, the revenue
22 A formal proof of this result follows: Let the fine (F) equal the sum of the aggregate
overcharge and deadweight loss to consumers measured from the initial zero profit equilibrium Q0 and P 0 . Note that at Q0 and P0 the fine equals zero, and it becomes positive and
increases as the cartel restricts output and raises price. We can write F as

fQo
F = (P-Po)Q + fQ (P-Po) dQ

where P and Q are the cartel's price (>P 0 ) and output (< Q0 ) respectively. The cartel's

profit (r), after deducting F, is -= PQ - C(Q) - F, where PQ is the cartel's total revenue

and C(Q) is its cost function. Substituting for F yields

fQo
= PoQ -

C(Q) -fQ

(P-Po) dQ

The first-order condition for maximizing profits is obtained by taking the derivative of ir
with respect to Q and setting it equal to zero. This yields or/Q = P. - C "+ (P-P.) = 0 or
P = C', where C' is marginal cost and P is the price along the demand curve in Figure 2.
The cartel maximizes profits by setting price equal to marginal cost-i.e., producing at the
efficient output Q1 in Figure 2.
I add that there is no single unique value for the optimal fine. A fine equal to the
aggregate overcharge plus deadweight loss computed on any initial point between (P0 , Q0 )
and (P 1 , Q1 ) will yield the efficient outcome. For example, imposing a fine on the cartel only
if it reduces output below the efficient level, Q1 , will also yield the efficient solution. See
supra text following note 8.
'3 At Q1, price is equal to P 1 , but after deducting the overcharge fine of P1 - P 0 the net
price will be P0 , the same net price as when output was Q0.
",Represented by Area E in Figure 2.
15Represented by Area B in Figure 2.
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loss to firms from restricting output is the area under the demand
curve between Q1 and Q0 in Figure 2.18 At the same time, however,
costs fall by the area under the marginal cost curve between Q1
and Q0. Since marginal cost is above the demand curve everywhere
in this interval, costs fall by more than revenues decline. Therefore, by restricting output the cartel earns a profit equal to the
difference between the areas under the marginal cost and demand
curve in the Q0-QI interval.
I have shown that firms earn positive profits at Q1 compared
to zero profits at Q0, even though they incur an antitrust penalty
at Q1. Hence the penalty would not deter firms from forming the
cost-saving cartel. To show that the cartel will produce at Q1, I
must show that Q1 is the profit-maximizing output, given the penalty. If the cartel were to produce more than Q1, its additional revenue would consist of two components: (1) a net price P 0 (after
deducting the overcharge penalty) on each unit beyond Q1, and (2)
a reduction in the penalty for deadweight loss for the additional
units produced. The sum of (1) and (2) is the area under the demand curve beyond Q1. This is less than the costs of producing the
additional units, the area under the marginal cost curve in Figure
2. Hence profits fall when output is greater than Q1. Similarly,
when firms lower output below Q1, profits decline because costs
fall by less than do revenues. In short, the cartel will produce at
the efficient output when the penalty equals the aggregate overcharge and deadweight loss computed from the output Q0 and
price P 0 .
II.

APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL

Setting the expected fine equal to the net harm is a simple
and, once explained, obvious rule for bringing about the efficient
level of offenses. 17 Yet as applied it yields some surprising results,
as the following examples show.
A. Joint Ventures
Assume competitors form a joint venture to sell their product.
Suppose the joint venture has characteristics that one typically associates with a cartel; for example, competitors set up a common
sales agency that makes all sales, or they agree not to sell in each
16This area under the demand curve is the sum of areas B and E.
17 To simplify the exposition I continue to assume, unless stated otherwise, that the
probability of apprehension and conviction is one and enforcement costs are zero.
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other's territory. At the same time, assume that the cost savings
associated with the joint venture are so large that the entire marginal cost curve shifts down, thereby increasing output. In terms of
Figure 1, output now is greater than Q0, and net harm, relative to
the previous competitive output, is negative. Does this imply that
the optimal fine should be zero and the joint venture does not violate the antitrust law? In general the answer is "yes," though two
situations must be distinguished: the first is a hypothetical example; the second is the recent ASCAP litigation.1 8
First, suppose that at the time the automobile was introduced,
automobile manufacturers formed a common sales agency enabling
them to raise price and restrict output. Assume that the cost savings in transportation made possible by the substitution of the automobile for the horse and carriage were so large that in terms of
Figure 1 (where the horizontal axis now denotes transportation services) cartel output is greater and price lower than the normal
price and output of the pre-automobile period.
Second, consider ASCAP, an association of composers, lyricists, and publishers of music, which acts as a clearing house between its members and those who wish to perform copyrighted
works from ASCAP's repertory. Under the typical arrangement between ASCAP and a user, such as a radio or television station, ASCAP issues a nonexclusive blanket license that permits the licensee
to perform all of the songs in ASCAP's repertory for an annual fee
without any limitation on the number of times each song is performed. Because ASCAP acquires only nonexclusive rights to its
members' compositions, each member still retains the right to license performance rights for his compositions. Thus, a user can
choose between an ASCAP license or a direct license of performance rights from the copyright holder of songs he wishes to perform. 19 The main advantage of ASCAP's blanket license is greatly
reduced transaction and monitoring costs compared to the cost of
negotiating and monitoring contracts with individual copyright
holders to acquire performance rights to the thousands of songs
used each year. In Figure 1 the horizontal axis would denote public
performances, and the higher marginal cost curve would represent
cost conditions when performance rights are licensed individually.
With the blanket license, the marginal cost curve would be lower
and coincident with the horizontal axis, resulting in a greater out1" Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (commonly known as the ASCAP

case).

19ASCAP's licensing system is described in id. at 4-5.
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put and lower price (at the margin), compared to the case of individual licensing of performance rights.2 0
In both the automobile and ASCAP examples, output is
greater and price lower than at the original competitive equilibrium position. Does it follow, therefore, that the antitrust law
should treat both situations identically? And should the optimal
fine be zero to free each group of any liability?
In the automobile example, the commercial development of
the technology, not the common sales agency, is the source of the
reduction in transportation costs. Comparing the level of output
when both the technology and the sales agency exist to its level
when both are absent would be relevant only if the sales agency,
not the automobile, caused the reduction. The relevant comparison
to make for determining whether there is an antitrust injury is between output with and without the common sales agency, given the
innovation. Without the sales agency, price would have been even
lower and output even greater. Therefore, the common sales
agency of automobile manufacturers should be treated as an ordinary cartel. The penalty would equal the aggregate overcharge plus
the deadweight loss computed on the assumption that the automobile would exist in the absence of the cartel.
In contrast, optimal damages are zero and there should be no
antitrust liability in the ASCAP case. In ASCAP the source of the
innovation was the blanket license that reduces transaction and
monitoring costs. This makes the blanket license a more attractive
option than the alternative of acquiring performance rights individually.2 1 Without ASCAP and the blanket license's pooling of
performance rights, costs would be higher and output of musical
performances would be lower. 2
20 In effect, the blanket license is an example of two-part pricing: an access charge for
performing songs in ASCAP's repertory, and a variable charge equal to zero for additional
performances. Since the licensee is entitled to unlimited use, he will expand the number of
performances until the added revenue from an additional performance is approximately
zero. Because the social cost of using an existing composition is zero, this leads to efficient
utilization of compositions (assuming the access charge is not so high that it discourages a
potential user from acquiring licenses). This and other efficiency features of the blanket
license, however, are not considered here.
21 The fact that licensees choose the blanket license over the individual licenses means
that the charge for the blanket license is less than the costs they would incur if they acquired performance rights individually.
22 Consider the distinction between a patent pool of competing and complementary or
blocking patents. A pool of competing patents is similar to a cartel among automobile manufacturers. By agreeing not to challenge competing patents, the pool enables patent holders
to restrict output and increase royalties. In the case of blocking patents, the pool is what
enables firms to take advantage of the full benefits of the innovation. Without a pool either
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The treatment of the two examples under the antitrust laws is
consistent with the economic analysis. The automobile manufacturers would be found guilty of a per se violation of section I of the
Sherman Act. In the ASCAP case CBS argued that the blanket
licenses of ASCAP and BMI2 3 fixed prices and therefore were per
se violations of the antitrust laws. 24 In rejecting this argument, the
Supreme Court focused on the transaction cost savings of the blanket license and the alternative of CBS negotiating individual licenses with copyright holders. The Court held these considerations
required that the case be judged under the rule of reason, a standard that balances the efficiency or output-enhancing features of a
practice with possible restraints on competition.2 5 To state this
conclusion in terms of the analysis I have developed in this paper,
the ASCAP combination causes no net harm, and it is essential to
the cost savings. The automobile sales agency, however, is not essential to the cost savings, but it is the source of harm to
consumers.
United States v. Sealy, Inc.,2 illustrates another example of
an output-enhancing joint venture. In Sealy a group of small mattress manufacturers (Sealy licensees) adopted a common trademark and allocated exclusive territories among themselves to manufacture and sell mattresses under the Sealy trademark. The
licensees imposed no territorial restrictions on their sales of nonSealy mattresses. The licensees accounted for about twenty percent of mattress sales in the United States.2 ' The Supreme Court
held the territorial allocation to be part of a horizontal scheme to
fix prices and found it unlawful. Although territorial allocation

the innovation would not be developed commercially or potential licensees would incur large
transaction costs to acquire rights to individual patents. This is similar to the added costs
that radio and television stations would incur if they acquired performance rights from individuals instead of from ASCAP.
2S BMI provides essentially the same service as ASCAP. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. at 5.
24 Id. at 6.
25 Id. at 2. On remand, ASCAP's blanket license policy was found lawful. See CBS v.
ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981). In subsequent litigation against ASCAP, a district court has held unlawful the blanket license acquired by television stations because it found that, unlike CBS, the local television stations did not have a
commercially realistic alternative to the blanket license. Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In terms of my analysis this implies that the cost
savings from the blanket license were even greater for television stations than for CBS. For
this reason, and because the blanket license did not restrict output, the economically correct
result would have been to hold lawful the blanket license in Buffalo Broadcasting.
26 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
7

R. PosNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 1, at 248.
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among competitors is a classic antitrust device, its effects here
were different. It provided an incentive for each licensee to promote and develop the Sealy trademark in its territory. Each licensee would be constrained from exercising market power within its
territory both by non-Sealy manufacturers and other licensees.
Viewed in this way the practice in Sealy is equivalent to a cost
reduction (the trademark lowered the cost of providing information to consumers) that lowers price and increases output. In short,
the Sealy arrangement enabled a small group of firms to expand
output by overcoming free-rider problems associated with developing a trademark or brand name and therefore optimal damages are
zero. Since the net harm was negative, the correct result would
have been no liability.
B.

The Social Cost of Monopoly

It has been argued recently that the social cost of monopoly is
far greater than just its deadweight loss. 2 8 Because firms spend resources to monopolize a market and to maintain their monopoly
position, part of the aggregate overcharge to consumers is transformed into a resource expenditure. In the limit, these expenditures could equal the present value of the monopoly profits. Because these expenditures produce nothing of value, they add to the
social cost of a monopoly. For example, in Figure 1 social cost
could be greater than $50 (area B) and possibly as high as $150
(area A + B). Will a social cost greater than deadweight loss have
any effect on the optimal sanction analysis?
Recall that the optimal fine equals the net harm to the community excluding the violator. It is irrelevant, therefore, how cartel
members spend their profits. They may spend $100 or $1 organizing and maintaining the cartel; either way, the optimal fine is $150.
This implies further that one does not have to know the gain to
the offender to set the optimal fine. Stated differently, the profitability of a violation is not a separate factor in setting the optimal
fine. Information on profitability is relevant only insofar as it conveys information on net harm.
I can give a formal explanation of why the optimal fine remains at net harm. Imagine that real resources of $100 are spent
on organizing and enforcing the cartel depicted in Figure 1. Al-

" See Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807
(1975); Tulock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224,
231 (1967).
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though the cartel's gross profits are $100 plus any cost saving, its
net profits are decreased by the $100 expenditure. By assumption,
net profits equal the cost savings from the reduction in output
(area C in Figure 1). Suppose the cost saving is $149. In our initial
analysis the cartel would have been efficient because a $149 cost
saving offsets a $50 deadweight loss. A fine of $150, equal to $100
overcharge plus $50 deadweight loss, would leave cartel members
with a $99 profit from setting up the cartel. When the cost of organizing and enforcing the cartel equals the overcharge, however,
net profits would equal minus $1. The $150 penalty would exceed
the $149 cost saving. Hence the cartel would not be formed. This
too is the correct outcome. To obtain $149 cost savings by spending real resources valued at $100 and having consumers suffer a
$50 deadweight loss would be inefficient. Suppose instead the cartel lowers cost by $151. Again a $150 fine yields the correct outcome. The cartel would be established because its members gain $1
($251 gross profits minus $100 costs minus $150 fine). This is efficient because the net resource saving of $51 offsets the $50 deadweight loss to consumers.
C.

Cartels with Less than One Hundred Percent Market Share

Often not all firms in an industry are cartel members. Assume
that nonmembers are equally efficient, have constant marginal (average) cost equal to the prior competitive price (therefore they
were not earning economic rents prior to formation of the cartel),
and have a fixed capacity that limits their output. The last assumption is necessary to enable the cartel to restrict industry output and raise price above the competitive level.
Figure 3 illustrates the competitive and cartel equilibriums.
Price increases from P 0 to P 1 , output falls from Q0 to Q1, the cartel produces Q2, and nonmembers, the competitive fringe, produce
Q1-Q2.2 9 Area B measures the deadweight loss (I ignore the possible additional element of deadweight loss analyzed in the previous
subpart), areas A0 and A1 measure the aggregate overcharge, and
area C the cost savings. As before, I assume that C would not occur
without the cartel. The key question is should the optimal fine include the overcharge caused by the cartel but not received by its
members (area A1 in Figure 3). That is, should the fine equal A0
z9 To derive the cartel's output, the cartel would maximize P(Q)(Q - Qf) - C(Qc) where
Qf is the fixed fringe output, Q. is the cartel's output, C(Q c) the cartel's cost function, and

Q = Qf+

Qc
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+ A 1 + B or just A0 + B?
FIGURE 3

Quantity
Q.

Q,

QO

Recall that the optimal fine equals the net harm to others.
This requires, therefore, that any benefits to others be subtracted
from the harm to consumers. Since the competitive fringe receives
a benefit of A1 from the higher than competitive price, net harm
equals the harm to consumers, areas A0 + A1 + B, minus area A1 .
To see why net not gross harm is the correct rule, consider the
following example. Let A 0 = $75, A1 = $25, B = $50 and C =

$51. By assumption, this offense is efficient because the $51 cost
savings exceeds the $50 deadweight loss. A fine equal to the gross
harm of $150 would yield the wrong result. Since the cartel's profit
of $126 is less than the proposed fine, the cartel would not form,
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industry output would remain at the competitive level, and the
cost savings would not be realized, resulting in an efficiency loss of
$1. In contrast a fine equal to the net harm of $125 would leave the
cartel with a profit of $1. The cartel would be formed and society
would be better off by $1.
Although the net benefit rule is perfectly general, the conclusion that the cartel should not be liable for any overcharges on
units sold by the competitive fringe holds only under the cost conditions illustrated in Figure 3. If the fringe's marginal cost were to
exceed the previous competitive price, then their rents or benefits
would be less than the harm to consumers on the units purchased
from the fringe. In the limit, if the fringe's marginal cost were constant and equal to the cartel price, optimal damages would equal
A0 + A 1 + B, the entire overcharge plus the deadweight loss. The
more typical case is one of rising marginal cost, implying an optimal fine between A0 + A1 + B and A0 + B, depending on the
precise cost function.3 0
Predatory Pricing 1

D.

The economic argument against cartels is based on the deadweight loss cartels produce. This might suggest (particularly if
there are no cost savings) that a deadweight loss resulting from a
monopolizing activity is a sufficient reason to impose a penalty. I
now show why this is false.
Consider a monopolist who reiponds to the entry of an equally
efficient firm by reducing price below marginal cost to drive the
30

The issue of allowing customers of the competitive fringe to recover from members of

the cartel was recently considered in Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc.,
596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979), and In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980). In Mid-West Paperthe court denied recovery to
customers of the competitive fringe, finding that the customers of the fringe lacked standing
to sue the cartel. The court gave two main reasons for denying recovery. First, since the
plaintiff was not in a direct relationship with the cartel, it was the fringe and not the cartel
that received a benefit on the sales to the plaintiff. Second, the court asserted that the
plaintiff might have bought from the fringe at the overcharge price even in the absence of
the cartel, making it difficult to determine whether the plaintiff was in fact damaged. 596
F.2d at 583-87. Although the first argument is consistent with the approach of this paper,
the second seems to conflict with the basic economics of cartels. If the cartel was effective, it
raised the price of paper bags (the product in the suit) and thus competitors of the cartel
were able to sell at a higher price. If the cartel did not raise the price, and hence customers
of the cartel's competitors did not pay a higher price, then neither the customers of the
cartel nor its competitors should recover. In Beef Industry (a monopsony case) the court

allowed ranchers selling beef to nonconspiring retailers to recover from the conspirators. 600
F.2d at 1166 n.24 (claim satisfies "target area" standing test).
31 The analysis in this part is developed in more detail in Easterbrook, supra note 1.
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entrant from the industry. The monopolist may have acquired his
initial monopoly position lawfully, by being more efficient. Belowcost or predatory pricing to maintain monopoly, however, is unlawful.32 Instead of monopoly, suppose the industry consisted initially
of competitive firms of different sizes. Now let the largest firm attempt to monopolize the market by pricing below cost and driving
out other firms that are equally efficient (at the margin). This too
is unlawful."
A number of studies of antitrust cases where predatory pricing
has been alleged indicate that successful predatory pricing is rare
or nonexistent.3 4 The typical private case alleging predation is
brought by competitors who are still in business but who have lost
sales during a period in which predation is alleged or by competitors who have left the business for reasons other than predatory
pricing. s5
In order to analyze the correct damage measure or optimal
fine in a predatory pricing case, I distinguish two forms of predation. In one form, predation is attempted but unsuccessful. Rivals
may be temporarily driven from the industry during a period of
below-cost pricing, but they return when the predator attempts to
raise price to the monopoly level. The second form, successful predation, occurs when rivals are driven from the industry for a period sufficient to enable the predator to raise price to the monopoly
level and to recoup more than his earlier losses.
Suppose a monopolist temporarily delays entry of equally efficient firms by setting price below cost and expanding output.
Eventually, however, new firms enter, price rises to marginal cost,
and the predation falls. Figure 4 illustrates the situation. During
the period of predation price is P 1 and output Q1; after predation

3

See 3 P.

33

See id.

AREEDA

& D. TURNER,

ANTITRUST LAW

711 (1978).

See, e.g., Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust, 13 J.L.
223 (1970); Koller, The Myth of PredatoryPricing: An Empirical Study, ANTITRUST
L. & EcoN. Rv.,Summer 1971, at 105; McGee, PredatoryPrice Cutting: The Standard Oil
(N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & EcON. 137 (1958); McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the
American Merchant Marine, 27 U. CH. L. REv. 191 (1960). See generally Easterbrook,
supra note 1, at 312-18. In fact, most predatory pricing claims have failed for inability to
show a dangerous probability of success.
35 See, e.g., United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977). For a discussion of this case, see Easterbrook, supra note 1, at
316-17.
EcoN.
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FIGURE 4
Price

Predator's Marginal Cost

Marginal Cost

Quantity

ends and entry occurs, price returns to P0 and output to Q0.
To be sure, below-cost pricing causes a deadweight loss equal,
in Figure 4, to the sum of (1) area B, the value to consumers of the
additional output Q1 - Q0 in the predation period less the cheapest
method of producing Q1 - Q0, and (2) the difference between the
predator's and industry's marginal cost curves up to Q1j . Deadweight loss is not a sufficient reason to impose a fine on the successful predator. Indeed, the optimal fine in this case is zero because there is no positive net harm to others. Figure 4 shows that
buyers gain consumer surplus of A0 on the units they would have
purchased at the competitive price and A1 on the added units they
purchase because of predation, while competitors lose profits of
" Had the predator not lowered his prices to increase his market share, the output
would have been produced at the lower industry marginal cost. The additional resources
needlessly spent to produce the output are a deadweight loss.
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kA0 , where k is the fraction of A0 they would have received as
producer surplus at the competitive price and output. Thus, during
the period of below cost pricing there is a net gain of (1 - k)A0 +
A1 to consumers and competitors. Figure 4 also shows that the
predator's revenue is less than his costs by the difference between
P 1 Q1 and the area under his marginal cost curve up to Q1. Thus,
the failed predator bears not only the full deadweight loss of his
activity but much more. Because the deadweight loss is a private
loss to the predator and not part of the net harm to parties other
than the predator, there is no justification for imposing additional
penalties. In short, the predator's activity is self-deterring because
he bears its fUll social costs; the rest of us, on balance, are benefited. And provided this is so, the net harm, and therefore the optimal penalty, is zero.
Successful predation occurs when the monopolist is eventually
able to raise price above marginal cost, more than recouping the
losses incurred during the predation period. The preceding discussion demonstrates that net harm, and hence the optimal penalty, is
the present value of the aggregate overcharge and deadweight loss
during the recoupment period minus the net benefit to others during the period of predation."7
Two further points should be mentioned. First, at the time
predation begins one may not know whether it will succeed. Yet
the optimal penalty is zero in one case but positive in the other.
Assuming we are able eventually to distinguish failed from successful predation, there should be no penalty or recovery until it is
clear that the predation is successful. In effect, this rule would delay enforcement proceedings until the recoupment period begins.
Moreover, it would probably eliminate most predatory pricing suits
brought by competitors because the suits typically involve instances of failed predation.
Second, the measure of damages in private suits against successful predators should not be the competitor's lost profits but
rather the present value of the ultimate overcharge to consumers
and deadweight loss minus net benefits during the period of belowcost pricing."8 The only justification for allowing competitors to sue
37 Where predation is successful, this is of course a positive number. The predator is
able to increase future profits such that the present value of the future profits is greater
than the present cost of predation.
38 If antitrust laws are a means to increase consumer welfare, then losses only to consumers, not to competitors, are relevant. For a discussion of the consumer welfare goals of
antitrust, see R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 66 (1978); R. POSNER & F. EASTRBROOK,
supra note 1, at 154.
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is that they are more efficient private enforcers than are consumers, because the claim of any individual consumer is small relative
to his costs of bringing suit. Thus, consumer enforcement may lead
to too few cases being brought and hence to underdeterrence of
antitrust violations. s9 Assuming competitors, in effect, are standing
in the shoes of consumers, optimal deterrence requires that the
damage award to a competitor should depend on net harm, not the
competitor's lost profits.40

III.

ANTITRUST AS AN INTENTIONAL TORT

In a recent paper, Richard Posner and I developed an economic model of intentional torts, such as assault, battery, conversion, and defamation, and showed that the model explained most
important common law doctrines governing intentional torts.4 1 Although price-fixing and monopolization are analytically equivalent
to an intentional- tort, and the Supreme Court sometimes has used
tort principles to analyze antitrust violations,4 2 we did not examine
the implications of our model for antitrust policy. I do so now,
after first summarizing our intentional torts model.
A.

An Economic Model of Intentional Torts

From an economic standpoint, the way to distinguish intentional from ordinary torts is that in the former the injurer spends
resources to increase the probability of harming the victim, but in
the latter both parties spend resources to reduce this probability.43 The intentional tortfeasor is by definition the party able
39 Although there are methods for aggregating many small claims (e.g., class actions and
parens patriae suits), these are considered costly enforcement methods relative to competitor suits. See Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 607-08.
40 If consumer enforcement is more efficient because, for example, there are several consumers with potentially large recoveries, then consumers, not competitors, should recover.
41 See Landes & Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. 127 (1981).
"2 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103
S. Ct. 897, 904-07 (1983); id. at 914 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (comparison of antitrust to

intentional torts); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 634 & n.5
(1981).

4' This definition of intentional is actually too broad because it would define mistakes
or self-defense as intentional torts. Our paper deals with this by including as costs the expense of avoiding mistakes or of not undertaking self-defense. Landes & Posner, supra note
41, at 137-38. Then the full costs of reducing the probability of injury due to a mistake or
failure to undertake self-defense may be positive. In another sense our definition seems too
restrictive because it excludes torts where the costs of avoidance are positive, but trivial
relative to the expected harm. We deal with this under the category of reckless behavior. Id.
at 130-32.
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to avoid the tort at the lowest cost. He need only refrain from
spending resources to avoid the tort; all other parties must spend
resources to avoid injury. This simple difference leads to different
implications concerning liability for intentional and ordinary torts.
They are as follows.
First, provided the harm to the victim exceeds or equals the
injurer's gain (before deducting his costs of committing the tort),
the optimal or first-best solution (ignoring enforcement costs) is
for the intentional tort not to take place. This saves the costs of
committing the tort (i.e., the costs of avoidance are negative, while
they are positive in the unintentional tort) and eliminates the
harm which, by assumption, is not less than the injurer's gain.
Holding the injurer liable for the victim's damages, adjusted upward if the probability of identifying and collecting damages from
the injurer is less than one, will lead him not to inflict the injury.
Second, the injurer's liability should not be eliminated or reduced if the victim is contributorily negligent. For example, suppose the victim's expected harm is $75 if he spends nothing on
self-protection but $50 if he spends $10. In an ordinary tort, the
victim would be contributorily negligent for not spending $10 on
self-protection and would not recover his damages under a negligence standard. Contributory negligence is not a defense to the injurer's liability in an intentional tort. Since expected costs are zero
if the tort is not committed but positive even if the victim undertakes self-protection, the optimal outcome is for the tort not to
occur. Making the victim's recovery depend on his not being contributorily negligent might lead him to spend $10 on self-protection. This sum is saved by a rule holding the injurer liable without
allowing a contributory negligence defense.
Third, in ordinary torts, efficiency can be achieved without
compensating the victims.44 In contrast, efficiency usually requires

compensating the victim of an intentional tort to prevent him from
spending resources to avoid the tort. (Of course if the law perfectly
deterred all intentional torts, there would be no occasions for compensation.) Suppose, however, certain activities are classified as intentional torts even though the expected harm is less than the injurer's net expected gain (after deducting his costs). Call these
activities socially beneficial or efficient intentional torts. An example might be a hiker lost in a storm who breaks into an empty
41 This is one of the basic results of the now standard economic analysis of a negligence
system with a contributory negligence defense. See Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 876-77 (1981).
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cabin to obtain food and shelter. If the victim is not compensated
(even if the offender pays a fine to the state), he would expend
resources to reduce his expected harm. This, in turn, might deter
the injurer from committing the tort because the victim's precautions have made it more costly to do so. To deter the tort, however,
would be inefficient. In contrast, if the victim is fully compensated
for his injury, he will not undertake expenditures for self-protection because he receives no benefit from them. As a result, the offender will commit the efficient tort.
B. Antitrust as an Intentional Tort
Nothing in the above analysis would be changed if we substituted "cartel" or "monopolization" for "intentional tort": the firstbest, or optimal, outcome is to impose a penalty sufficient to deter
the inefficient antitrust violation; there should be no defense of
contributory negligence; and the victim should be compensated. I
consider these conclusions in turn.
Part I examined the cartel that lowered costs by less than the
deadweight loss. This is equivalent to the intentional tort that
harms the victim by more than it benefits the injurer. The per se
rule against price fixing, by always holding the cartel liable for the
harm it does, deters firms from forming inefficient cartels. Similarly, the common law rule that holds the intentional tortfeasor liable for the victim's harm creates incentives for the efficient
outcome.
As with intentional torts, the victim's conduct should not be
relevant to the antitrust violator's liability. In short, there should
be no defense of contributory negligence. Consider the following
example. Let a manufacturer of nuclear reactors agree to provide
its customers (utilities) with their future requirements of uranium
at today's price plus an adjustment for future increases in mining
costs. Assume the manufacturer holds a negligible inventory of
uranium but plans to fulfill its contracts by making future
purchases. Now suppose producers of uranium form a cartel and
increase price. In response the manufacturer breaches its contracts
with utilities, is sued by them, and in turn sues the cartel for treble
damages.45 The cartel argues that the manufacturer was contribu41 This example is similar to the recent uranium litigation. Westinghouse, a supplier of
nuclear reactors, breached its uranium contracts with utilities, was sued by the utilities, and
in turn sued firms it claimed to be cartel members. The uranium dispute gave rise to a
torrent of litigation. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th
Cir. 1978) (price-fixing suit against oil company); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
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torily negligent by failing to cover its contracts in the futures market and by signing contracts with utilities at low prices when it
should have known about the cartel. Even if it is true that a wellmanaged or reasonably prudent firm would have covered in the futures market or obtained information on the likely formation of
the cartel, however, our intentional torts analysis says the cartel's
defense should not be allowed. If the defense were allowed, purchasers would avoid being contributorily negligent by incurring additional expenditures both to uncover .possible antitrust violations
among their suppliers and to hedge in futures markets against possible antitrust violations. Knowing this, suppliers would be deterred from forming inefficient cartels. This outcome, however, is
less efficient than one where both cartels are deterred and expenditures on self-protection are avoided. We can achieve the latter outcome, as shown by our intentional torts analysis, by holding the
cartel liable and rejecting a defense based on the victim's
negligence.
The principal argument for awarding damages to private enforcers is to create powerful enforcement incentives. Awarding
damages to victims, as we showed in our analysis of intentional
torts, has the additional benefit of reducing socially inefficient expenditures on self-protection. 46 A component of the latter cost is
the deadweight loss that arises when consumers substitute toward
lower valued products. A possible benefit, therefore, of victim compensation is to reduce the incentive to substitute away from the
monopolized product, thereby to reduce or eliminate the deadweight loss. This surprising result comes about in the following
way.
To simplify, I make the following assumptions: the competitive price and output are $1 and 100 units; the cartel raises price
by $1; the costs of discovering the cartel and prosecuting its members are zero; the probability of collecting damages is one; and consistent with my earlier analysis the penalty equals the sum of the
aggregate overcharge ($1 x units purchased at the cartel price) and
the deadweight loss. The latter two assumptions imply that firms
will form a cartel only if the savings in costs made possible by their
joint action more than offset the deadweight loss. What, however,
Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977) (contract breach).
46 When it is costly to apprehend and convict antitrust violators, victim enforcement
may not be the preferred policy. For example, if the victims of a cartel are consumers who
individually have insufficient stakes to pursue a violator, then enforcement by injured competitors of the violator or by public agencies may be the better solution.
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is the size of the deadweight loss? Since customers of the cartel, by
assumption, recover their $1 overcharge in a costless legal proceeding, the net price of the cartel's product is the same as the competitive price. No deadweight loss occurs because consumers continue
to purchase at the cartel price the same number of units they purchased at the competitive price.
Before introducing some complications, note that the typical
legal measure of damages in a price-fixing or monopolization case
brought by a customer is treble the illegal overcharge times the
number of units purchased. 47 Trebling in part reflects the belief
that some price-fixing and monopolization offenses are not detected. Finally, attorney's fees and other costs may be assessed
against the culpable defendant. One criticism of this damage computation is that it does not compensate for the deadweight loss.
That is, customers who reduce their purchases or make none at all
do not recover on the units they would have purchased if price had
been lower. 48 Although one can support this exclusion because of
difficulties in proving how much a consumer would have bought
but did not, there is also a theoretical reason: anticipated compensation of the full overcharge can eliminate any deadweight loss. If
consumers anticipate full recovery for any overcharge, they will not
reduce their purchases below the original competitive level. Thus,
for a given overcharge there will be no reduction in quantity demanded, and no deadweight loss. 49 I should mention several qualifications to this result.

47

See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489-94

(1968). See generally R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 1, at 549.
48 There are other more important criticisms of damage awards. The most important is
that treble damages are awarded even if the violation is not concealable and the probability
of convicting the defendant is near unity. Furthermore, even if the offense is concealable
and the probability less than one, there is no way of knowing whether three is the correct
multiplier.
4, Anticipated compensation for the overcharge will not always eliminate the deadweight loss. Consider first the example in Figure 1 where it was necessary to reduce output
(from Q0 to Q1 ) to achieve cost savings (area C). Yet if demand is perfectly inelastic, how
can the cartel reduce output? One way is to ration available supply among purchasers. Although consumers would be willing to pay any price above P 0 for the rationed output because their net price after deducting the overcharge recovery is still P 0 , the net profits of
the cartel is its cost saving. Since the latter can be less than the deadweight loss brought
about by rationing, failure to compensate for the deadweight loss can lead to an inefficient
outcome. Consider also the example in Figure 2. There we eliminated the deadweight loss
caused by external technical diseconomies by reducing output from Q0 to Q 1. But if output
cannot be reduced, we cannot eliminate the deadweight loss. Alternatively, if rationing
reduces output, the cartel will cut back too far, to the point where MC equals P 0 because
the net demand curve faced by the cartel (after deducting the per unit overcharge) is horizontal at P0 .
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(1) Customers may not anticipate any antitrust recovery. If
they do not, they will substitute away from the monopolized product and a deadweight loss will occur. Yet an antitrust recovery,
though uncertain, is a potential source of revenue and there is no
strong reason to treat it differently than other uncertain revenue
sources. (2) If customers are risk averse, uncertain damages,
though compensating in terms of expected value, may not be sufficient to prevent substitution away from the monopolized product.
(3) Even though the defendant pays the optimal penalty, only part

may be received by the victim. For example, some of the victim's
costs may not be recoverable,50 and in a large class action suit a
substantial share of the recovery may go not to victims but to

lawyers.
Although points (2) and (3) imply that the deadweight loss is
not eliminated, it is still reduced compared to the no compensation
alternative.51 A more fundamental objection is that I have ignored
how the cartel responds to knowing that buyers anticipate an antitrust recovery. If the recovery is complete, the cartel, in effect,
faces a perfectly inelastic demand curve at the competitive output.
Although this leads to an indeterminate price, output remains at
the competitive output and deadweight loss is zero.52 However, if
compensation is incomplete, the cartel faces, compared to the nocompensation case, a less elastic (but not perfectly inelastic) demand curve. In response, the cartel will set a higher price. If damages equal the net harm, the efficiency aspects of the rule that we
analyzed earlier continue to hold. 53 Yet, if there is no compensation for the consumers' deadweight loss, then anticipated but par5
tial recovery for the overcharge can lead to inefficient outcomes. '
For example, the plaintiff's time costs are not recoverable.
",Partial compensation has the effect of rotating the original demand curve to the right
around the competitive equilibrium because the consumer will treat a given overcharge as
representing a smaller net increase in price. (The net increase equals the overcharge minus
partial recovery, per unit purchased.) Therefore, for a given overcharge, the reduction in
quantity demanded will decrease as the partial recovery increases. And the smaller the reduction in quantity demanded, the smaller the deadweight loss. Note that we still measure
deadweight loss along the original demand curve because the difference between it and the
demand curve that takes account of partial recovery denotes the expected recovery per unit
purchased.
52 The conclusion is subject to the qualifications presented supra at note 49.
11 One exception is the analysis depicted in Figure 2. Since the demand curve is less
elastic compared to the no compensation case, the cartel equilibrium occurs where the less
elastic demand curve intersects marginal cost. This leads to an output greater than the efficient output Q1.
" The analysis is similar to that presented supra at note 49 except that here the output
reduction is brought about by a higher price.
"
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CONCLUSION

In this paper I have developed the economic theory of the optimal antitrust penalty. The optimal penalty should equal the net
harm to persons other than the offender, adjusted upward if the
probability of apprehension and conviction is less than one. This
sanction encourages efficient behavior. It will only deter those violations that impose deadweight losses greater than the cost savings
brought about by the violation. It will not deter efficient violations,
those where the cost savings exceed the deadweight loss.
I applied the analysis of optimal penalties to the following enforcement issues in antitrust. I showed that the optimal penalty is
zero for joint ventures that increase output. Similarly, whether one
characterizes cooperative behavior among firms as a joint venture
or as a cartel depends generally on whether cooperation expands or
restricts output. I showed also that the optimal penalty is unaffected when part or all of the monopoly overcharge is transformed
into a social loss by firms spending resources to organize and maintain the cartel. I examined whether customers who bought from
competitors of the cartel at a higher than competitive price should
be able to recover from the cartel for the overcharge. If the competitors are no less efficient than cartel members, no recovery
should be allowed. In the case of predatory pricing, I showed that
the optimal penalty is zero when below-cost pricing is followed immediately by entry. When below-cost pricing delays entry enough
for the monopolist to more than recoup the losses incurred during
the predation period, then the optimal penalty is positive and
equals the net harm in the recoupment period minus the gains to
consumers during the period of below-cost pricing. In the final section of the paper I applied the economic analysis of intentional
torts to an antitrust violation. This enabled me to show the efficiency gains from compensating victims of an antitrust violation
and to explain why it is inefficient to allow a defense of contributory negligence to an antitrust violation.

